And thus, although it is nondiegetic, the command cooperates with the diegesis rather than threatening it…well obviously.

To be completely repetitive, I felt the same as many of the others in the class in that the reading was suprisingly manageable. It was also very interesting, with a lot to take in. I would say rather than being confusing, it was extremely dense, with many new area’s of video game study to digest. There was one passage that I read several times and still cannot comprehend.

It is perhaps important to stress that, while many of these enabling acts are the center of most games…Thus the “xyzzy” comand in Adventure,  which teleports the player character to and from home base, is technically a nondiegtic machine act, but its nondiegetic status is covered over by the narrative of the game, which insists that the command is a magic spell, and thus, although it is nondiegetic, the command cooperates with the diegesis rather than threatening it….This wormhole through space and time reveals the tension often present in games whereby deigetic objects are used as a mask to obfuscate nondiegetic (but necessary) play functions.

On the opposing side, I want to point out one passage I thought was really interesting that I had not considered before which is on pages 18 to 19 and discusses the role of the player within the game.  It was interesting to see a comparison of a relationship between the machine and game itself and the play, and what implications this has on gameplay, and the players role in the game.

Galloway Reading

I followed the reading fairly well but was tripped up on one spot in particular. On page 25 Galloway begins discussing the relationship between play and the nature of language. Unfortunately I wasn’t able to follow this very well. When he said, “So at a basic level, play is simply how things transpire linguistically for Derrida, how, in a general sense, they happen to happen”, I didn’t understand at all. This concept makes zero sense to me. I was also confused as to how it fit into the essay. help?

I’m no Jake Shapiro, but…

…I also found the Galloway reading to be fairly digestible.  I actually preferred it over most of the other readings we’ve done for this class (particularly the Koster book) because Galloway doesn’t BS around.  He backs up his logic with specific references to other games, and I liked how he applied theories for analyzing more familiar mediums, such as film and computer software.  It really put into perspective what video games are — while they are obviously similar to narratives, visual art forms and information systems, they also exist as their own separate medium which should be analyzed independently.  My biggest confusions came from the more technical terms about game machines, and other vocabulary that Galloway used which was sometimes over my head.  The occasional references to games I am unfamiliar with made me skim over certain passages, but they didn’t particularly confuse me, and I found that if I skipped over what I didn’t know, I could usually read on and Galloway would eventually clarify his point in a way that made more sense.  Overall I think I got the gist of what he was trying to say, and actually came out with a better understanding about how to approach video game studies than I did after reading some of the other articles for this class.

Background would help..

I, like my fellow students, found myself quite surprised when I was actually able to digest a portion of the Galloway reading.  Specifically, the beginning of the section ‘The Dromenon’ was familiar because of our prior readings.  Unfortunately, my understanding of the reading ranged from, “well yeah, that makes perfect sense!” to, *stare blankly; reread; Google terminology; reread; reread; stare blankly…*.

Aside from the technical jargon that hindered my understanding, I found that my ignorance of videogaming was probably holding me back.  Although I could often break down and at least logically understand what Galloway was writing, it was likely that my potential understanding from experiencing the games and terms he discussed would have been greater.

The first quadrant is about the machinic phylum and the vitality of pure matter.  Consider Yu Suzuki’s Shenmue.  One plays Shenmue by participating in its process.  Remove everything and there is still action, a gently stirring rhythm of life.  There is a privileging of the quotidian, the simple (8-9).

Although this made sense, I didn’t fully understand it because I am completely ignorant of the game Shenmue.

Just ask Mike Green, he was on the ice the entire time

I’ve found the Galloway reading to be relatively straight-forward so far, which could be due to the experiences I’ve had with video games in my past and what little I remember from taking a programming class in high school; but there was one section that befuddled me to no end. On pages 25-26, where Galloway is quoting Jacques Derrida’s concept of the term “play”, I was very confused as to what point Galloway is trying to raise. I suppose it could be the fact that I don’t see much of a connection between video game theory and the “very nature of language” (pg. 26), or it could be that I am confused at how in the same paragraph the author could say “After citing Levi-Strauss on the practical impossibility of arriving at a total understanding of language…”

In general, I am not so much confused about what Galloway/Derrida is trying to say in this passage as much as I am confused as to how this relates to the points that Galloway is making in this essay. Literally in the passage before he was describing how Half Life had a keyboard set up that directly represented move and expressive acts in clusters of keys, and then all of a sudden we are subjected to an almost nihilist discourse on the nature of language, which is quite exhausting. I am almost left wondering if this section is entirely relevant, as Galloway’s earlier handling of the subject of the definition of play seemed very adequate to me, even though admittedly we did spend a great deal of time reading Huizinga (kind of) and Caillois (no doubt about it).

In totality, talking about diegetic acts of video games, like the reaction of characters in NHL 10 to the impressive hits of Mike “Game Over” Green or the nondiegetic actions of choosing whether to wear the current sweaters of the Caps versus one of the classic eagle jerseys seems to make a lot of sense, but going on a discourse of the nature of language doesn’t. But although I was able to “pause” my reading of Galloway to write this blog in confusion, I know that when it comes time to unpause the game, Mike Green will be on the ice. And as we have all learned, knowing is half the battle.

Diegetic enabling acts?

I should say that the tangent off into linguistics was somewhat “wait, what?” for me as well, but I think people have pretty much covered it, so instead I’m going to touch on a part in the 4th moment section on page 31:

“These should be called enabling acts. … With an enabling act, the machine grants something to the operator…Thus receipt of any of the aforementioned items–power-ups, goals, the HUD (excluding input elements), and health packs–all constitute enabling acts.”

This would all be fine if it were just in the area about the machine; after all, as Galloway says, the operator’s involvement in getting these things can be thought of (perhaps artificially, but at least reasonably) as being distinct from their actually receiving them. Why, however, is this necessarily nondiegetic? In Xenogears, for example, there is a part where one of the main characters is given a sword from another character after having put aside weapons for many years. It is a pretty diegetic moment unto itself (I don’t want to spoil the details of why), but it has distinct nondiegetic implications: this character suddenly does something like 20-30% more damage than he did just beforehand. In general it seems like situations like these can easily come up.

I think I may perhaps be forgetting about something from earlier in the chapter about these sorts of things blurring together and how Galloway separates them, however.

I think I get Galloway?

So I had a hard time picking out a passage for this particular post, because I feel like I understand where Galloway is coming from. There were certain passages about the cockfighting and what not that required some extra glances to sink into my brain, but most of Galloway’s ideas seemed to mesh seamlessly.

However, on page 35-36 the following passage gave me a little trouble “The HUD is uncomfortable in its two-dimensionality, but forever there it will stay, in a relationship of incommensurability with the world of the game, and a metaphor for the very nature of play itself. The play of the nondiegetic machine act is therefore a play within the various semiotic layers of the video game. It is form playing with other form.”

While Galloway does qualify his statement beforehand, one clear exception to the rule is Metroid Prime for the cube. I think the word I get stuck on here is incommensurability, which would imply that the HUD is completely and utterly separated from the world of the game.  Also, the fact that Galloway describes it as “uncomfortable in its two-dimensionality.” I understand the point he is trying to make; that it is base level machine work giving you further input on how to execute your mission in a game. However, I would disagree that it is not part of the game world. Metriod Prime offers a great example of this, especially in just the small effects like the water evaporating off of the visor after its been wet. However, even in other games where the HUD could consist of just a map and a health bar, I think it would almost be impossible to play the game without those elements. So should they really be considered in a relationship of incommensurability if they are absolutely necessary for the world of the game to function?

The Play of the Structure

I, too, approached this reading prepared to have most of the material be over my head, and was surprised when I was actually able to grasp a decent portion of the chapter. Granted I don’t have a very firm grasp on all the ideas and concepts presented thus far, I understand the very (very!) basic gist of what Galloway attempted to convey. I felt that the majority of my struggle dealt with digesting unfamiliar words. Once I had an idea of what a word meant, I was able to get the basic gist of the sentence or passage that the word was used in. I employed this process countless times throughout the chapter, and each time (for the most part), I would realize that Galloway was referring to something maybe not so complex, but describing it in a complex way.

However, I was not able to use my two-step process successfully on pages 26 and 27. These pages deal with The Play of the Structure, and quite honestly, there was not a single line I could comprehend. How does play explain the nature of language? “As soon as it comes into being and into language, play erases itself as such.” (27) Uh… what? As I was reading, I felt like Galloway had switched gears here, and all too suddenly, since I was just getting more comfortable with the idea of diegetic and nondiegetic. But somehow, as Galloway says, “it comes full circle.” Once Galloway went back to discussing nondiegetic acts, I was able to get back on track.

Pages 1-38 are like Crocs—surprisingly digestable.

After reading through the entire chapter once (and most of it twice) and making several excursions through the dictionary, I am fairly confident in my understanding.  There is too much material to regurgitate a simple summary, but when examining any particular section I believe I follow him correctly–any particular section, that is, except for one.  One sentence, which I shall mark in bold italics.

“And, as discussed, nondiegetic machine acts are about the various intensities of agitation between the various layers of the game itself, whether it be the agitation between two- and three-dimensionality, or between connectivity and disconnectivity, or between gameplay and the lack thereof.  Games are always about getting from here to there.  They require local differentials of space and action, not an abstract navigation through a set of anchored points of reference” (p. 36).

… … …What?  These are terms which show up nowhere else in the chapter, and go undefined and unexplained despite being words with numerous meanings, including “differentials”, “abstract”, “navigation” and “anchored points of reference.”  Perhaps I am wrong, but I feel as if he’s trying to emphasize that in videogames there are actions, which are performed in specific contexts, in contrast to navigating an abstraction.  First, navigating is an action, and thus I am confused.  Second, a “set of anchored points of reference” sounds suspiciously like my understanding of the word “context,” and thus I am further confused.  Halp.

~Jamie

Diegetic or Nondiegetic?

While for the most part I found Galloway’s writing to be interesting (though dense) the main issue that I had was Galloway’s treatment of diegetic or nondiegetic operator acts.  Some of his disconcerting and confusing language can be seen in the following passage from page 12:

The second moment of gamic action refers to a process with spontaneous origins but deliberate ends.  This is gamic action as a subjective algorithm.  That is to say, in this second moment, video game action is a type of inductive diachronic patterning of movement executed by individual actors or operators.  We are now ready to explore the second quadrant of gamic action: nondiegetic operator acts.

While I was able to grasp the general idea, I believe he could have chosen to describe these two concepts in a much more straightforward way, and in doing so, it would have made his writing much more approachable to non-academics.

Commo Say What?

So I was expecting the worst from this Galloway character as was the rest of the class. I was actually pleasantly surprised. I’m not saying I got all of it, cause that by no means happened; but did I get most of it? I’d like to think so. I think his specific examples really helped a great deal with understanding, especially with all his new fangled jargon.

I’ll admit the reading did take me about 2 hours to get through. Way longer than I’d like to admit, but I was determined to understand it, partially because I’d been told I wouldn’t. The reading involved a great deal of Google Search “Define …” but I did eventually piece together what Galloway was in fact trying to say. While I understood most of the words, the big picture did escape me in some of his points.

On Page 31, Galloway states, “Following Huizinga, these actions have the ability to destroy the game from without, to disable its logic. But at the same time, they are often the most constitutive category of game acts, for they have the ability to define the outer boundaries of aesthetics in gaming, the degree zero for an entire medium.”

I understand the first sentence completely, probably because I have seen my brother freak out all too many times due to our internet lagging while he is playing Nazi Zombies with his friends on X-Box Live. The second sentence leaves me in a stupor cause even as I try to puzzle through this, I come up with nothing. I guess the way I’ve boiled the next line down in my head is as follows, “At the same time, the glitches/bugs/lags/etc are the essential pieces in the physical make up of the game as far as game acts go, because they define the parameters for the visuals of games, the basis of the entire game system?” But why visuals are involved with glitches when he is discussing a fail on the machine’s part, I couldn’t reason out.

Re: Reading Galloway

I was pretty confused by pages 6-8 and Galloway’s description of “diegetic” and “non-diegetic” elements of games. I see that they refer to the elements of games that exist both inside (diegetic) and outside (non-diegetic) the “pretend world” (or “second reality” as Callois would say), but somewhere along the way i found myself completely lost as he analyzed which gamic elements and nongamic elements fell into which category. An example here from page 8:

“To be sure, nondiegetic elements are often centrally connected to the act of gameplay, so being nondiegetic does not necessarily mean being nongamic. Sometimes nondiegetic elements are firmly embedded in the game world. Sometimes they are entirely removed”

Somehow its just not connecting in my mind how elements can be both “firmly embedded in the game world” and completely outside the “pretend world”. Or maybe I’m just misunderstanding his terms here. I guess the “game world” and the “pretend world” are not one and the same, but rather overlapping circles on another confusing Venn diagram?

Thorough insights

I have to agree with many things that Jake has said. I was a bit worried when Professor Sample explained the difficulties that we might face with the reading. However, as I began to read the essay, I became interested enough to keep reading. Galloway took an approach toward video games which is along the lines of what I am used to. The explanations and descriptions were detailed yet in logical manner. Yes, he did get technical with his statements but overall I enjoyed the passages. Being a chemistry major, I am used to seeing things and understanding things with clear outlines and concise flow. He took the reader on a journey to understanding each and every corner of a video games. Even if the reader was a gamer, he or she would be able to understand the content of this essay pretty well. Games, of course, are difficult to define and so is the idea of play and fun. But Galloway defines games and their components quite well. It was interesting how he referred to a gamer as an operator and a game as a machine. This sounds horribly boring, as he hinted but to be honest even though I play games on a daily basis, he is right. When it comes to bare bone of things, playing a game is actually like being an operator of something. There was one passage which was interesting to read since I have never noticed what he was talking about in real life. He compared the difference between arcade games and console games at home. Having a fixed amount of life compared to having a health that needs to maintained is something I have never even thought about but the comparison sets a great distinction between the two types of games.  This is probably narrative gameplay was more realistic, and more fun on arcades compared to game consoles. Since there are limited life, and limited time, there are only few chances to succeed in the games, whereas in game consoles now-a –days, gamers can save games before doing something daring or taking on challenges. Which gives the game a more unrealistic feel.

Cockfight

In the first chapter of Alexander Galloway’s book, the connection between culture and gaming is discussed over several pages.  Galloway claims that “play is a cultural phenomenon that has meaning” and that “play is a symbolic action for larger cultural issues.”  These statements, along with hinting that games indirectly let the player interact with social realities, are agreeable and understandable.  However, Galloway’s first mention of culture is not as relatable:

“In the essay, ‘Deep Play:  Notes on the Baliese Cockfight, ‘Geerts offers a fantastically evocative phrase:  ‘cultre, this acted document.’  There are three interlocked ideas here:  There is culture, but culture is a document, a text that follows the various logics of a semiotic system, and finally it is an acted document….(…Geertz’s observation, then, is not to say that culture is a text but to say that action is a text…) (14).

After reading (and failing to understand) the above passage, I continued to search out all of Galloway’s cultural references.  I found myself not only understanding these future references, but also agreeing with them.  However, I was unable to find either an explanation or reference back to this passage.  I don’t understand how culture can be defined in a document.  Furthermore, I don’t understand the connection between video games and culture as a document.

Expressive Acts

“Firing one’s weapon is used interchangealby both to attack and to open doors. In fact, experientially these acts are equivalent:they both exert an expressive desire outward from the player character to objects in the world that are deemed actionable. That one expressive act opens a door and another kills a nonplayer character is insignificant from the perspective of gamic action” (Galloway 24).
Maybe I am interpreting ‘gamic action’ the wrong way but what I consider gamic action to be completing the mission, winning the level and the steps to achieve said goal. From this perspective I am having trouble seeing how these two actions do not affect the action. For instance, In Tom Clancy’s Rainbow Six and other similar games, if you kill a hostage then you fail the mission. By Galloway’s logic should there be no difference between killing the hostage and the terrorist? Galloway lost me here. Please help.