One of the areas covered in Tuesday’s discussion was the differences in nature and purpose of the Operator and Machine. Specifically, we skirted the question of whether a machine can become the operator of a game (henceforth referred to as “The Wonderfully Intrepid Question of Joyous Automation Loops,” or “TWIQJAL”†). I feel that it would be valid to posit that the answer to this question is all of yes, no, and somewhat; a definitive answer would depend on further clarification, such as the following.
Does the Operator – Machine relationship extend to game media other than video games?
If we posit that the operator machine relationship does not extend to other game media (i.e. interpersonal games not based on hardware or software programs), then the scope of situations in which an “Operator” exists, and thus the scope of situations in which TWIQJAL can be validly assessed, becomes fairly well-defined. This is the stance I am taking, as the Operator – Machine spectrum is introduced with video games in mind, and its scope was not intended to extend beyond such, as far as I can determine from the Galloway reading.
Must something be able to be considered ‘play’ in order to be considered a game?
If a game‡ should be considered play, then it follows that TWIQJAL’s answer depends on whether a Machine can play. The answer to that, if we draw from Caillois’ definition of play, is a resounding “almost, but no.” A machine programmed to play a game wouldn’t be expected to have the level of cognizance required for what most would consider a human level of “rational free will” in the matter. As such, the “game” is involuntary, and therefore not play based on Caillois’ definition. I am of the viewpoint that a game must be considered play in some form to exist as a game; the entire purpose of games is to play them, and when stripped of this aspect of play, a game becomes nothing but an interactive system, no more of a “game” than any mundane electronic interface.
These are by no means the only questions that might be raised in assessing TWIQJAL, but the picture so far strongly favors the answer to be “no.” More specifically: “No, a machine cannot act as the Operator of a video game as presented by the Operator-Machine spectrum of analysis. A machine cannot engage in such activity in a willful manner such as is required for the activity to be considered ‘play’ as Caillois defines it. Without the existence of play, the game ceases to be a game insofar as the applicability of the Operator-Machine relationship to it.” And they all lived happily ever after.
Footnotes.
† Pronounced “twihk-jal”.
‡ “Game” in the active sense of the word, i.e. ‘the game that takes place’ as opposed to ‘the game sitting on the shelf’. “Video games are actions,” as Galloway says.